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NO. 45 OCTOBER 2018 Introduction 
The Changing Dynamics of the 
Kurdish Question 
Arzu Yılmaz 
The Kurds in the Middle East have become significant political and military actors 
in the context of the fight against IS. One of the most important consequences of this 
situation has been the transformation of the Kurdish Question. Frustrated with the 
largely fruitless efforts to achieve equal rights and equal political footing in the coun-
tries where they reside, Kurdish parties have tended to change their perceptions and 
strategies. There is a remarkable shift under way: from the fight for “justice, freedom 
and equality inside a given nation state” to the “defence of Kurdistan” as a political ter-
ritory. Therefore, a fragmented approach towards the Kurdish Question as a domestic 
issue of national concern is not realistic anymore. Developments in the Kurdish land-
scape require a review of the conventional stance and a comprehensive solution in 
order to balance competing interests and cope with the evolving challenges in the 
Middle East. 
 
The cross-border nature of the Arab Spring 
that motivated the masses, above all else, 
weakened the positions of power centres 
vis-à-vis their peripheries, where disadvan-
taged groups live who have been subordi-
nated for a long time by authoritarian 
regimes. The Kurdish parties were the most 
– if not the only – well-prepared groups 
in the peripheries of imploding nation-
states in the Middle East. Their political 
and military organisations responded to 
the region-wide demand for change in the 
status quo, which was characterised by 
the widespread repression of free speech, 
human rights abuses, economic misman-
agement, and corruption. 
The Rise and Fall of the 
“Kurdish Moment” 
In this context, the emergence of the Islamic 
State (IS) and the role that the Kurdish 
fighters have played in the struggle against 
the IS have provided an invaluable oppor-
tunity for Kurdish political actors. Kurdish 
leaders were finally on the political scene 
acting in the name of the Kurdish people, 
with political and military support coming 
from the United States as well as some 
European states. Thus, it was a historic 
“Kurdish moment” seemingly enabling the 
Kurds to get rid of denial, subordination, 
and coercion. 
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Nevertheless, despite the inflexible 
stance of international actors and the risks 
stemming from the objections of regional 
actors such as Turkey and Iran, the Kurds in 
Iraq staged a referendum for independence. 
Tens of thousands of Kurds from four parts 
of Kurdistan rallied to construct an autono-
mous region in Syria. Armed conflict broke 
out once again following a two-year-long 
peace negotiation process in Turkey. In Iran, 
Kurdish actors decided to return to armed 
struggle after two decades of non-violence. 
However, the initial tally of such efforts 
demonstrated that, for the Kurdish people 
in the Middle East, the losses turned out to 
be greater than the gains. 
The Consequences of the 
Referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan 
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
has been the most remarkable achievement 
of the Kurds in the Middle East. When 
the Iraqi army withdrew in the face of IS 
attacks in 2014, this achievement was 
boosted by gaining de facto jurisdiction 
over disputed areas defined by Article 140 
of the Constitution of Iraq. Given this, the 
primary goal of the referendum for inde-
pendence from Iraq in 2017 was indeed to 
expand the de jure boundaries of the KRG 
through the Diyala, Nineveh, and Kirkuk 
provinces in disputed areas. 
The consequence, however, has been a 
territorially narrowed as well as politically 
and militarily weakened KRG. The destruc-
tion in disputed areas is almost irreparable. 
KRG forces lost 40 per cent of the territory 
it previously held. With Bagdad’s military 
control of Kirkuk, the export of 300,000 
barrels of oil per day from the KRG to Tur-
key came to an end. In disputed areas, the 
Iraqi government removed Kurdish officials 
from local administrative posts and secu-
rity-related positions. Meanwhile, just in 
the province of Kirkuk, 30,000 Kurds lost 
their homes. The KRG presidency, which 
was recognised internationally as the legiti-
mate representative of the Kurds, was sus-
pended, and the KRG had to re-engage with 
Baghdad via two separate political power 
domains, namely Arbil and Sulaimaniya. 
Ultimately, a year after the referendum, 
political trauma remains for the Iraqi Kurds 
and the Kurdish parties. In the eyes of most 
people in Iraqi Kurdistan, the KRG experi-
ence is over, but no one knows what comes 
next. The weak power-sharing arrangement 
between the two prominent Kurdish parties 
– namely the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) – has completely deteriorated; the 
former is about to be marginalised in Bagh-
dad while the latter is losing political ground 
in the KRG. Repercussions from the recently 
held parliamentary elections in Iraq and 
the parliamentary elections in the KRG 
demonstrate that reconciliation is unlikely. 
On the other hand, the international sup-
port that the Kurds in Iraq are searching 
for in order to recover is apparently limited, 
with the acknowledgement of the Kurds 
being “good fighters”, but nothing more. 
The international actors’ preference for the 
reconstruction of Iraq’s territorial integrity 
is evident. 
The Kurds in Syria: 
The Shift of the “Rojava 
Revolution” to North Syria 
The ongoing process for establishing an 
autonomous Kurdish region (Rojava) in 
Syria, like the KRG, is in turmoil. The Kurd-
ish-ruled areas are suffering because of 
Turkish military intervention beyond its 
borders. One of the three cantons ruled by 
the Kurds in Syria, Afrin, is already back in 
the hands of Turkey-backed Syrian opposi-
tion groups. The remaining two areas are 
under threat from both Turkish attacks as 
well as the expanding control of the Bashar 
al-Assad regime throughout northern Syria. 
It is debatable whether the hesitant pres-
ence of the United States on the eastern 
banks of the Euphrates River would help 
Kurdish self-rule to survive. 
In this sense, the “Rojava Revolution” is 
far from meeting the expectations of the 
Kurds following seven years of war and the 
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death of almost 10,000 Kurdish fighters. 
Meanwhile the use of the denomination 
“Rojava” has already given way to the term 
“North Syria”, with an emphasis on the east 
of the Euphrates River. Finally, the US-led 
coalition’s distinction between the People’s 
Protection Units (YPG), as a legitimate local 
force, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), as a terrorist organisation, tends to 
validate the Turkish argument that portrays 
the two groups as  one terrorist organisa-
tion. As a result, the Democratic Union Party 
(PYD) cannot participate in the Syrian peace 
process, either in Geneva or in Astana. 
Collapse of the Peace Process 
in Turkey 
The peace process that began in 2013 
between Turkey and the PKK turned into 
a destructive war in just two years. Turkey 
launched an intensive military offensive, 
not only against the PKK bases in the moun-
tains, but also against the PKK-affiliated 
Kurdish urban militias in the cities. In the 
last four years, the Kurds in Turkey as a whole 
have experienced harsh and brutal meas-
ures based on the state of emergency rule. 
During the course of this escalation, the 
government has forcibly displaced about 
500,000 people and destroyed the homes of 
255,000 people. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (HDP) saw its ousting from 
the political scene through the imprison-
ment of thousands of its members, includ-
ing its co-chairs and parliamentarians. In 
addition, the government removed 93 elected 
mayors in Kurdish provinces and took 
direct control of the municipalities by ap-
pointing state commissioners. Despite this 
suppression, the HDP finally succeeded in 
crossing the threshold during parliamen-
tary elections held in June 2018. However, 
considering the overall political situation in 
the newly constituted presidential system of 
Turkey, no one expects a normalisation pro-
cess to take place soon in the Kurdish areas. 
Escalation of Repression in 
Iranian Kurdistan 
Behind the walls of the Islamist revolution-
ary regime in Iran, Iranian Kurdistan had 
been relatively quiet since the mid-1990s. 
The Kurdish political parties could only 
operate in exile, mainly in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
For decades, they were far from being able 
to mobilise the masses in Iranian Kurdistan. 
Meanwhile, Kurdish activists in Iran be-
came more influential in the political 
sphere, as experienced during the Green 
Movement in 2009. In the wake of the Arab 
Spring, this influence increased through the 
rise of nation-wide demonstrations in Iran. 
When 25-year-old Kurdish woman Farinaz 
Khosrawani died in 2015 while trying to 
escape a sexual assault by an Iranian mili-
tary officer, unprecedented protests spread 
across Iranian Kurdistan. 
It was during this time in 2015 that the 
Iranian Kurdish parties decided to return to 
armed struggle. The response of the Iranian 
regime was to increase levels of repression. 
Kurdish activists received severe sentences, 
and the number of death sentences rose 
sharply. There are reports of 135 Kurds 
being executed in Iran just between October 
2016 and October 2017. Furthermore, Iran 
killed 14 members of Iranian Kurdish par-
ties in a rocket attack on their headquarters 
in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
A Deadlock 
A peaceful solution to the Kurdish Question 
on the level of existing nation-states is evi-
dently not an achievable target in the near 
future. The states in question are far from 
turning into democracies. The Iranian re-
gime remains standing, despite all efforts 
to topple it; the reconstruction of Iraq is not 
progressing; the Assad regime seems poised 
to survive; and even Turkey – a NATO 
member and still an EU candidate coun-
try – has moved far ahead on its path 
towards autocracy. 
Moreover, the response of Western coun-
tries to the Arab Spring, for instance in 
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Egypt and in Syria, has demonstrated that 
– whatever the extent of massacres, dic-
tatorships, and violations of human rights 
– safeguarding the political borders and 
the territorial integrity of the states is con-
sidered the foremost priority. 
Once the IS threat was contained, the 
Kurds were called upon to retreat within 
the existing national boundaries, as in 
the cases of Iraq and Syria. However, inter-
national actors were silent when the Ira-
nian-backed militia forces took control in 
disputed areas of Iraq in October 2017 and 
Turkey invaded Afrin in January 2018. 
In view of such circumstances, a dead-
lock in the Kurdish Question is more likely 
than any fast solution. A closer look at the 
changing dynamics of the Kurdish Ques-
tion, however, indicates that such a dead-
lock might soon pose serious new challenges 
in the Middle East. 
The Changing Dynamics 
Traditionally, international actors treated 
the Kurdish Question as a domestic issue of 
the states in the region where the Kurdish 
people reside, namely Turkey, Iraq, Iran, 
and Syria. Such a perception was shaped 
during the Cold War era, when Western 
powers supported the central authorities 
of these states and helped them control the 
political borders. Drawing a sharp distinc-
tion between domestic and foreign policies, 
the Kurdish Question remained contained 
within national boundaries and was re-
garded only as a security issue of the indi-
vidual nation-states. 
As a result, the Kurds found themselves 
socially, economically, and culturally dis-
connected from one another, while the 
Kurdish identity was reshaped and differ-
entiated in its relation to the dominant 
nationalist projects of the constituent 
states. Furthermore, the Kurdish national 
movements that emerged as a reaction to 
these nationalist projects developed in close 
dependency with the geopolitical fragmen-
tation of Kurdistan. Given the linguistic and 
religious differences, however, this frag-
mentation appeared to represent the very 
nature of Kurdish society itself. So it was 
easy to emphasise the political differences 
among the Kurds and to legitimise the con-
ceptualisation of the Kurdish Question 
as being merely a domestic issue of the re-
spective nation-state. In this sense, Kurds 
turned into vulnerable minority groups in 
the respective nation-states, rather than 
being a nation unto itself. Kurdistan figured 
as a geo-cultural term without any political 
reference to Kurdish aspirations. 
This state of affairs, however, has changed 
over the course of recent decades. It was 
first the establishment of a Kurdish autono-
mous region in northern Iraq in 1992, 
and then the emergence of Kurdish rule in 
northern Syria by 2012 that triggered the 
cross-border mobilisation of the Kurds. 
They have been reconnected and reorgan-
ised due to four main elements: immigra-
tion, armed struggle, border trade/business, 
and the media. Migration reconstructed the 
strictly separated former identities of Kurds 
from different nation-states into one Kurd-
ish identity, with an emphasis on common 
ethnicity. 
Armed-struggle has weakened ideological 
differences in the name of the defence of 
Kurdistan. Enhanced cross-border trade and 
business has allowed for the capitalisation 
of transborder kinship and tribal bounda-
ries and helped new interest groups to 
emerge. More than one hundred TV chan-
nels as well as various radio stations and 
social networks have enabled the Kurds of 
different states to communicate with each 
other, despite difficulties due to linguistic 
differences. 
The Emergence of Kurdistan As a 
Political Territory and the Unity 
of the Kurds 
Thus, it is fair to claim that the Kurdish 
Question is being reshaped in a fluid 
regional context that transcends national 
boundaries. Today, the Kurdish struggle for 
“justice, equality, freedom” has obviously 
switched to the “defence of Kurdistan”. A 
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lack of peaceful solutions – besides the 
restrictions imposed by central authorities 
– encourages bottom-up changes that 
favour separation rather than integration. 
In recent decades, we have observed the 
emergence of Kurdistan as a political term, 
with a greater emphasis on the Kurdish 
homeland, in both discourse and practice. 
Unlike in the past, for instance, Turkish 
Kurds consider themselves as Kurdi Bakuri 
(Kurds from northern Kurdistan) and Iraqi 
Kurds as Kurdi Basuri (Kurds from southern 
Kurdistan). The Kurdish people’s political 
orientation today is concentrated on the 
Kurdistan theatre more than ever. Accord-
ingly, the most popular topic of today’s 
Kurdish agenda is the “unity of the Kurds”, 
but not the political developments in the 
countries where they reside. 
However, the Kurdish political parties’ 
responses to these newly emerging expec-
tations have been far from adequate. They 
could hardly unite during the fight against 
IS and, soon after, were once again trapped 
in rivalries. In this sense, the loss of Kirkuk, 
in particular, after the referendum in Iraqi 
Kurdistan on 16 October 2017 constituted 
a turning point. Regardless of their party 
affiliations, the vast majority of Kurdish 
people accused the Kurdish political actors 
for that failure, rather than the regional 
and international actors. According to many, 
the main reason for the failure was the lack 
of unity among the Kurdish parties. 
Such a perception gained strength when 
the Turkish army invaded Afrin a couple of 
months after the loss of Kirkuk. The PYD’s 
obstinate dominance over all other Kurdish 
parties in Syrian Kurdistan, in the end, 
weakened the legitimacy of Kurdish rule 
and paved the way for Turkey’s interference 
via Syrian opposition groups, which had 
more or less cooperated with these Kurdish 
parties since the civil war erupted in Syria. 
Another case was the withdrawal of all 
Kurdish forces from Sinjar, a Yazidi-popu-
lated district in northern Iraq on the Syrian 
border. Sinjar was under de facto control 
of the KRG before the IS emerged. When 
the IS attacked Sinjar in 2014, however, the 
KRG withdrew its troops. The KRG was only 
able to return to Sinjar by cooperating with 
the YPG and other PKK-affiliated groups, 
which launched a prompt rescue operation 
for the Yazidis in the face of IS assaults. 
Afterwards, the KDP and the PKK coordinated 
to liberate Sinjar in 2015. Since then, Sinjar 
has become a symbol of co-existence be-
tween Peshmarga and the Guerilla connec-
tion between south and west Kurdistan. 
However, the tide soon turned in Sinjar 
as the Kurdish parties got into a power 
struggle on how to rule the city. The con-
sequence was the militarisation of everyday 
life in Sinjar while the Yazidis distanced 
themselves from Kurdish parties in order to 
secure their own interests apart from intra-
Kurdish conflicts. In the end, both the KDP 
and the PKK forces withdrew, and the city 
of Sinjar fell into the hands of Baghdad in 
late 2017. 
It is true that different factors and actors 
have played crucial roles in all of these 
cases. The overall impact of those failures 
on Kurdish public opinion, however, is that 
the Kurdish parties have prioritised their 
own interests rather than the interests of 
the Kurdish people, and Kurdistan as a 
whole. Nevertheless, in recent elections, 
there have been remarkably lower turnouts 
in the Kurdish regions. For instance, a Kurd-
ish voter who expressed his unwillingness 
to vote in the Kurdistan parliamentary elec-
tion said on 30 September: “I only ever 
voted in the referendum because that was 
for Kurdistan. These elections are for the 
parties, not for Kurdistan.” 
On the other hand, both the voters who 
voted in the parliamentary elections in Iraq 
and the KRG rewarded the KDP vis-à-vis 
other Kurdish parties. Whereas the number 
of votes for the PUK, for instance, decreased 
and the other parties did not achieve re-
markable successes, the KDP increased its 
vote share. Such a result simply indicates 
that, despite the negative results, the major-
ity of Kurdish voters did not punish the 
KDP, who had, in fact, championed the 
independence referendum. On the contrary, 
the voters showed less interest in the par-
ties that opposed the independence of the 
KRG from Iraq.  
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Even so, it is hard to say that the KDP is 
more powerful than it was one year ago. A 
lack of unity in Kurdish politics apparently 
undermines the legitimacy of the power 
that any party gains via elections or mili-
tary success. Nevertheless, after the parlia-
mentary elections in the KRG, the KDP will 
likely partner with the PUK, in particular, 
in order to consolidate unity once again in 
the KRG – although the KDP could easily 
form the government with the support of 
the 11 seats designated to minority groups 
in the KRG Parliament. On the other hand, 
the dominant pro-Kurdish party in Turkey 
has already declared that it would look to 
build an alliance with the Kurdish parties 
for the local elections in March 2019. 
According to a Peshmerga commander, if 
the Kurdish parties did not clash with each 
other during recent developments, it was 
mainly due to armed groups not being wil-
ling to do so. Indeed, Kurdish armed groups 
have not clashed since the early 2000s. Such 
a modus vivendi was achieved following a 
power-sharing agreement brokered by the 
Kurdish parties, namely the KDP, the PUK, 
and the PKK, who committed not to inter-
fere in the others’ political and military 
spheres of influence. However, this state of 
affairs has evidently become invalid since 
the emergence of the IS in 2014. All Kurd-
ish parties have expanded their spheres of 
influence by building new alliances with 
regional and international actors while 
their armed groups have had to face off 
against each other on many occasions. On 
these occasions, however, all groups have 
avoided clashes – except one case in Sinjar 
in March 2017 – and repeatedly assured 
followers that the Kurdish-Kurdish fight 
was over. 
Such a stance, in fact, relies on two new 
dynamics. Despite their strong affiliation 
with a specific Kurdish party, the Kurdish 
armed groups have become more diverse in 
terms of their members’ origins. Unlike in 
the past, for instance, the number of Kurds 
outside of Iraqi Kurdistan in the KRG forces 
has notably increased. At present, there are 
thousands of Syrian Kurdish fighters, called 
Leshkeri Roj, under the command of the KDP, 
whereas KRG Special Forces, Zerevani, basi-
cally consist of ex-PKK fighters who are 
originally from Turkey. This is also true for 
the armed groups affiliated with the PKK – 
this group already constitutes the most 
diverse Kurdish armed group, as it has oper-
ated in four parts of Kurdistan for decades. 
Accordingly, any Kurdish fighter from any 
Kurdish armed group in the current context 
simply claims that he or she “fights for Kur-
distan” and gives no significant reference to 
a geographical region or political party. In 
this sense, it is fair to say that the “defence 
of Kurdistan” as a common cause prevents 
clashes among the Kurdish parties while 
providing a common ground for co-exist-
ence as well. 
In sum, the Kurdish national cause 
evidently lacks the necessary unity or mili-
tary and political capacity to win any power 
struggle over Kurdistan territory. However, 
it is also a fact that there is no other national 
and/or international offer that could sup-
press a bottom-up mobilisation of the Kurd-
ish national awakening. In this sense, it will 
not be easy to roll back the Kurds within 
national boundaries, especially when the 
states in question are either imploding or 
too fragile to exert dominance over Kurdish 
settled areas. 
The Role of the West 
Against the backdrop of these develop-
ments, the question arises as to whether the 
fragmented approach to the Kurdish Ques-
tion as a domestic issue of nation-states can 
still be the sole approach. Clearly, it is hard 
to expect the West to play a decisive role in 
the context of the Kurdish Question today 
when Western countries do not identify a 
“common threat” in the Middle East after 
the defeat of the IS. Even if they came to a 
shared risk-evaluation, the decline of trans-
atlantic relations under President Donald 
Trump thwarts any possibility of seeing eye 
to eye on Iran, Turkey, or Russia. 
Moreover, the new motto of US foreign 
policy, “America First”, followed by the 
imperative of “no boots on the ground”, 
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indicates that the American military pres-
ence is about to decline in the Middle East. 
The United States tends to limit its role 
to “backing” allies instead of engaging in 
military interventions. However, Washing-
ton lacks the support of its “strategic allies” 
in the region for this approach. 
The tense relationship between the 
United States and Turkey, in particular, is 
eroding their alliance and is prone to lead 
to a series of crises. Despite the claim that 
US support for the Kurdish fighters in Syria 
was the main driver for the tense relations, 
the case of Pastor Andrew Brunson has 
recently shed light on the fact that the 
problem is deeper and has developed to a 
degree where sentences such as “The White 
House has decided to give up on Turkey as 
an ally” are formulated. The most visible 
signs of such escalation are the American 
sanctions that have exacerbated the eco-
nomic crisis in Turkey. Turkey’s insistence 
on buying an S-400 surface-to-air missile 
system from Russia additionally under-
mines the possibility of a recovery follow-
ing the release of Pastor Brunson. Overall, 
there are indicators that Turkey might close 
ranks with Russia and Iran. 
In such circumstances, one could argue 
that the newly emerging alliance between 
Saudi Arabia and Israel as regional partners 
of the United States could replace the stra-
tegic alliance with Turkey and function as 
an efficient barrier against Iranian expan-
sion in the Middle East. The initial signs, 
however, suggest that Kurdish political ac-
tors are likely to be the beneficiaries of this 
newly emerging Saudi Arabia–Israel–US 
alliance. Thus far, neither the Saudis nor the 
Israelis have objected to Kurdish aspirations. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has already com-
mitted $100 million for the “stabilisation 
projects” in the areas held by the Kurdish 
dominated Syrian Democratic Council. 
In the absence of Turkey, in particular, 
on the side of the United States, there is no 
doubt that Kurdish political actors in Iraq 
would be the other beneficiaries of the US 
anti-Iran policy. First, the Iraqi Kurds could 
reduce their dependence on Turkish eco-
nomic and military support. Second, it 
would help Kurdish political actors to co-
operate with the Sunnis of Iraq in order 
to mitigate the Shia dominance in both 
Kurdistan and disputed areas. 
Furthermore, despite their vulnerabili-
ties, the Kurdish political parties still hold 
significant positions in the Middle East 
as the major local powers in the Kurdish-
populated areas. Without the consent of 
the Kurdish political parties, it will be diffi-
cult to progress with the reconstruction 
of – or re-stabilisation in – Iraq and Syria. 
The Kurdish political parties may not have 
the capacity to unite, but they have the 
capacity to upend domestic and regional 
balances. This is also true for the Kurdish 
parties in Turkey and Iran. In both cases, 
the control of central authorities over Kurd-
ish-populated areas relies on forces that 
undermine their legitimacy and strengthen 
the Kurdish parties’ role as representatives 
of the Kurdish will. 
In this context, the “Kurdish Moment” 
is likely to be resurrected if there is a con-
tinued power vacuum due to shifting alli-
ances in the Middle East. European coun-
tries are apparently neither prepared nor 
willing to fill the vacuum. It is also doubt-
ful whether Russia has the capacity to 
invest more in the Middle East. 
In sum, it is obvious that the course of 
these developments urgently require an up-
date of the Western approach towards the 
Kurdish Question in order to cope with 
the evolving regional and geopolitical chal-
lenges in the Middle East. Correspondingly, 
both the internal and external dynamics of 
the Kurdish Question are also evolving. It 
is unrealistic to try to turn back the clock in 
the Middle East. 
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